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AUTHOR Shoemaker, Pamela J.
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ABSTRACT

A study was conducted to test the hypothesis that the mass media act as agents of social control by varying the coverage of political groups in relation to how deviant they perceive the groups to be. Editors from the 100 largest daily newspapers in the United States were asked to rate 11 political groups on four scales thought to measure political deviance. Fifty-seven responded. Media treatment was determined through content analysis of 604 articles in 7 major newspapers over a 1-year period. The vast majority of the articles were from the "New York Times." Content was analyzed based on two dimension: prominence and character. Prominence included the length of the article, its position in the newspaper, and the position of the group in the article. Character was based on four legitimacy criteria: evaluation, validity, viability, and stability. Results indicated some support for the theory that the media act as agents of social stability; however, a direct causal relationship between a journalist's perception of a group's deviance and the kind of article he or she will write about the group cannot be assumed. (JL)

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DEVIANCE OF POLITICAL GROUPS AND MEDIA TREATMENT: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF A CRITICAL HYPOTHESIS

By

Pamela J. Shoemaker
Mass Communications Research Center
University of Wisconsin-Madison

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Critics of the U.S. mass media (such as Miliband, 1969; Gitlin, 1980; Lauderdale and Estep, 1980; Paletz and Entman, 1981; and Gans, 1979) have suggested that the media act as agents of social control. They do not suggest that the media prevent the publication of new and different ideas, but rather that the media vary their coverage of political groups according to how different the groups are from the status quo.

Miliband (1969) says that views which do not somehow support the political consensus are brought into ideological line by ridiculing them as "irrelevant eccentricities which serious and reasonable people may dismiss as of no consequence."

Gitlin (1980) describes how the press covered the 1960's left-wing student movement, Students for a Democratic Society. What the media did, says Gitlin, was to distort the SDS movement "in such as way as to seem not so much dangerous as incoherent, senseless, and . . . absurd."

Paletz and Entman (1981) contend that the media cover various political groups in "drastically and dramatically different" ways.

Lauderdale and Estep (1980) suggest that the media may be unwitting agents of social control, rather than purposive guardians of centrist ideology. They imply that "distortions" in the media about political groups may be caused by stimuli outside of the media and that the distortions are then "used by social control agencies of the society."

Gans (1979), however, sees "moderatism" as an enduring value of the news. Moderatism discourages excess or extremism. "Groups which exhibit what is seen as extreme behavior are criticized in the news through pejorative adjectives or a satirical tone." But Gans also sees the media's role in social control as being more subtle and possibly not very effective. He defines "social control" as preventing or discouraging "people from acting and speaking in ways disapproved of by holders of power." The media act as agents of social control to the extent that they warn against disorder and carry the messages of "official controllers." This control may be ineffective, says Gans, to the extent that people distrust the news media.

Alinsky (1971) says that "all societies discourage and penalize ideas and writings that threaten the ruling status quo."

THE THEORY

The mass media are hypothesized to act as agents of social control by varying their coverage of political groups in relation to how deviant they perceive the groups to be: The more deviant a political group is perceived as being, the more newspeople will ridicule it. The theory predicts that media coverage of deviant groups will reflect the fact that the media do not take these groups seriously and that the media do not treat deviant groups as legitimate political contenders. The group's opportunities to reach its goals are decreased, and a possible threat to the status quo is removed.

Figure 1 recasts this theoretical statement as a simple causal chain model. The media are very important in this model, since the media transmit their perception of a group's deviance to the electorate.

People are capable of making their own judgments about a group's deviance, of course, but most people do not have direct experience with most political groups. What they know about political groups comes primarily through the media. So the journalist's perception of a group's deviance is very important.

The first part of this model is largely a specialized restatement of Westley and MacLean's (1957) gatekeeper model, but the extended model goes beyond Westley and MacLean to consider societal effects of the gatekeeping function.

Deviance

Moscovici (1980) says that a minority is by definition deviant, but it is probably more useful to think of deviance as expressing more about a group than its size. In general, deviance implies being different from, or, in some cases, the breaking of norms.

Wells (1978:196-197) outlines three ways in which deviance has been defined. The conventional approach for many years was a normative one: that behavior is deviant when it breaks social rules or norms. Society determines who or what is deviant. Then the labeling perspective challenged this normative definition. Labeling advocates believe that a group is deviant when and because someone else calls it deviant. Finally, behavior is consciously deviant to the extent that a person or group is aware that what he is doing is in some sense wrong or disapproved.

Lauderdale (1980) says that political deviants challenge the "legitimacy of rules, laws, or norms because of some commitment to a higher or, at least, different moral order," while "apolitical" deviants try to circumvent the accepted legitimate political order for personal gains. Merton (1968) draws a similar parallel, but calls political deviance "nonconformity" and apolitical deviance "crime."

Lauderdale and Estep (1980) say that the mass media are important in determining whether group members are defined as

being protestors or as deviants. If the group members want to be accepted as legitimate, political actors, then media acceptance of that definition will be crucial.

Deviants challenge the norms in a purposive and active way, says Walton (1973). Former theories of political deviants as "ineffectual, stigmatized" individuals have to give way to a new theory of "a decision-maker who actively violated the moral and legal codes of society."

What is the political norm in the United States? Centrist politics, represented by the Republican and Democratic parties. What is "being different" from the U.S. political norm? Being a noncentrist political group--a political group that lies away from the center of the ideological political spectrum, either to the left or to the right.

Most researchers talk about deviance as if it is dichotomous, but it seems more reasonable to look at deviance as a continuous variable. Then we can look for degrees of deviance. This is consistent with the European concept of the political spectrum as a continuous scale extending from the extreme left to the extreme right. It is also consistent with the American tradition of identifying political groups as being arrayed on this spectrum.

Gans (1979) suggests that journalists array groups on a 7-point ideological spectrum: left-wing radicals, left-leaning liberals, liberals, moderates, conservatives, ultra-conservatives, right-wing extremists.

The Democratic and Republican parties are generally viewed as centrist groups, while various "third" parties usually find their support further away from the political center, both to the right and to the left of the centrist groups.

There are other kinds of political groups than formal political parties, of course. Although elected offices are almost always held by representatives of one or another political party, most legislation and many election outcomes are influenced by lobbyists from a myriad of political groups which have specific legislative interests. In fact, there is probably more opportunity for variance in the degree of political deviance among nonparty political groups than among political parties.

Political parties are constrained by the need to sway a large number of voters if they are to win elected positions. As legislative lobbyists, however, other political groups can afford the luxury of their principles, no matter how removed they are from the ruling party's norms. They must only persuade a small number of overworked, underinformed legislators--legislators who often depend on the special interest "experts" to give them the relevant "facts" about legislation.

Thus it is not surprising that nonparty political groups have proliferated in the two-party dominated United States. The structure of the political system is two-party politics, but the determination of outcomes is often dependent on special-interest political groups. It is these groups that spread out toward the

edges of the political spectrum as they represent their often small but vocal constituencies.

Many researchers (such as Kornberg, Mishler, and Smith, 1975; Coveyon and Piereson, 1977; Stokes, 1963; Weisberg and Rusk, 1970; Brown and Taylor, 1973; and Levitin and Miller, 1973) have challenged the Hotelling-Downs model of locating political concepts only along a one-dimensional space (Downs, 1957; Hotelling, 1929), generally taken to be the liberal-conservative or left-right continuum.

The consensus is that most people probably use more than one dimension when comparing political entities, but researchers disagree on what the multiple dimensions might be and on how the traditional liberal-conservative dimension relates to the others.

Kornberg, Mishler, and Smith (1975) believe that "the more knowledgeable and politically sophisticated individuals are," the more frequently they order entities in a left-right fashion, consistent with Stokes (1963) contention. Less educated and politically unsophisticated people may not understand the concepts "liberal" and "conservative" and may use dimensions based on specific issues in addition to or in place of the left-right scale.

Stokes (1963) says that the dimensions used by individuals may change widely over time. He suggests economic and social welfare policy as possible dimensions.

Kornberg, Mishler, and Smith (1975) concluded that two dimensions contribute to candidate evaluation: a left-right dimension and a party identification or government power dimension.

In most cases, the dimensions suggested seem to be bound to the specific time, place, and political entities studied. Therefore, while there is general agreement that the traditional left-right liberal-conservative dimension is inadequate for use as a universal and sufficient measure of political concepts, no one has yet found either a unidimensional replacement or a second or third universal dimension which could add sufficiency to the left-right scale.

If Stokes (1963) is right, then finding two or three universal dimensions may be impossible. Perhaps political dimensions will always be peculiar to the structural variables defining the political situation. The country, the economy, the time, the type of political entity, and a myriad of other variables could affect the salience of various dimensions.

The Media's Role

Who decides where a group should be placed on the political spectrum? In theory, every individual probably accesses a personal political spectrum or other political deviance scale.

When he encounters a political group, he rates the group on the scale(s).

In practice, however, few people directly encounter political groups. Most of the information they have about political groups comes from the mass media. (Paletz and Entman, 1981) What most people know about the Ku Klux Klan, they have learned from the media, not from personal experiences with the Klan. If people rate the KKK on an ideological scale without having direct contact with the KKK, then they are not making an independent judgment. They are rating the KKK based on the images they <u>received</u> of the Klan--images that were transmitted by the media or, perhaps, via interpersonal communication.

This makes the journalist's perception of the Klan very important. Labeling theorists say that a group will be defined as being deviant if someone labels it as deviant, not because of any inherent badness. (Wells, 1978) So it is possible that journalists may <u>create</u> deviant groups by the ways in which they treat the groups. The labels journalists apply to political groups and the extent to which the groups are covered in the mass media will affect the reader's perception of the groups.

Cobb and Elder (1972) say that information manipulation is power. If the media control the information communicated to the electorate about political groups, then the media have power over the electorate. This is not the same thing as persuasion (although if the media have the power to persuade voters, then

they also have power over voters), since no overt attempt by the media to influence voters is required for a power relationship to exist.

Lipsky (1970) concurs, stating that the "media are capable of denying the existence of acts and movements of protest through selective inattention. Or, through selective emphasis, they can derogate the significance of protest by caricature or bias."

Shoemaker (1982) showed that differing media coverage of political groups can affect the reader's perception of the group's legitimacy, which Cobb and Elder (1972) say is a prerequisite for successful participation in the political system. Shoemaker found that the media can affect four dimensions of political legitimacy (evaluation, legality, viability, and stability) in different ways.

Political groups recognize the intermediary role of the mass media in reaching a larger public. Cobb and Elder (1972) discuss five strategies groups use to get support: arousal, provocation, dissuasion, demonstration of strength of commitment, and affirmation.

But while the political group sees the mass media as crucial to its success, the media may view the group with suspicion. As Gans (1979) puts it, "political ideologists are suspect, but so are completely unprincipled politicians."

The constraints of media deadlines often stop the journalist short of reaching ultimate truth, which Kimball (1967) says is the

journalist's goal. A number of researchers have considered the constraints put on journalists by newsgathering structures such as deadlines, news beats, news conventions (i.e., objectivity, authoritative sources, inverted pyramid writing styles), and the journalists' role conceptions. (Goldenberg, 1975; Tuchman, 1973; Sigal, 1973; Gans, 1979; Schudson, 1978; and Kimball, 1967)

But if ultimate truth cannot always be reached, journalists validate their methods by consensus with other journalists. The journalistic concept of "objectivity" is closely tied to journalistic routines and rules for newsgathering methods.

It was not until after the propagandists of World War I showed how "facts" could be manipulated that journalists began drawing a sharp distinction between facts and values. (Schudson, 1978) Journalists began replacing "a simple faith in facts with an allegiance to rules and procedures created for a world in which even facts were in question. This was 'objectivity.'" A news report was considered objective if it followed rules established by the journalism community.

Schudson (1978) outlines three criticisms of objectivity as the final arbitrator of fairness. (1) Journalists do not consider the political assumptions on which their stories rest. Their life styles and political values will affect what is seen as being objective and what is reported. (2) The form of news stories biases what is reported toward the observable and unambiguous facts and away from processes. Conflict is emphasized, and

existing power structures are reinforced because journalists favor institutions that are best able to stage pseudo-events. Powerful institutions like government can control and manipulate events, whereas social movements and reformers hold issue orientations that are ignored unless they too gain the power to stage events. (3) "The process of news gathering itself constructs an image of reality which reinforces official viewpoints." Journalists can become "mere stenographers for the official transcript of social reality."

The effect is that, as Sigal (1973) puts it, "newsmaking is a consensual process" which takes place within "a context of shared values." This context of shared values does not refer to the personal political views of journalists, says Sigal, but rather to "attitudes widely shared among reporters and editors in the news community, attitudes which might properly be called the journalist's creed, or ideology."

Flegel and Chaffee (1971) found that reporters feel their articles are influenced more by their own opinions than by opinions of editors, readers, or advertisers; however, they claimed that they didn't put a lot of emphasis on their own opinions, rating them as having only minor influence on articles.

Paletz and Entman (1981) define the journalist's concept of professionalism as "a set of internalized norms that guide and structure the local reporters' stories." These norms, they say, help reinforce the legitimacy of the status quo.

According to Gans (1979), journalists often make a conscious effort to keep their personal political views apart from their roles as political reporters. In the media he studied, only a minority of journalists admitted to having conscious political values, a functional omission when having political values in conflict with the publisher could mean the loss of a job.

Gans also believes that the news media, especially the national media, recruit people with no particular political values. This is not to say that value judgments do not enter the news, however. To the contrary, as Gans points out, values in the news are not preference statements, but rather assumptions built into journalistic structures about reality. "When journalists must decide what is new, they must also make assumptions about what is old and therefore no longer newsworthy; when they report what is wrong or abnormal, they must also decide what is normal."

Journalists may still defend their articles as objective if they do not intend any particular consequence or effect. (Gans, 1979) Journalists have some freedom to reach evaluative conclusions as long as they consciously exclude personal values. "Journalistic values are seen as reactions to the news rather than a priori judgments which determine what becomes newsworthy."

Lauderdale and Estep (1980) call attention to two dimensions of "media distortion or manipulation in reporting an event": the amount of coverage given an event and the characterization of the event. These indicators influence both the perception of a group

as "protest" or as "deviant" and also the probable success of the movement.

Gans (1979) says that values in the news may not be so easy to discern; researchers must learn to "read between the lines" to discover what activities are reported or ignored and how they are described. "If a news story deals with activities which are generally considered undesirable and whose descriptions contain negative connotations, then the story implicitly expresses a value about what is desirable." Much news, says Gans, is about the violation of values.

Editors, says Gans, know how to "soften" a reporter's copy to alter harsh judgments. "By softening, reactionary politicians become "conservatives," and lobbyists are sometimes described as "advocates." Editors rarely "harden" judgments.

Hypotheses

The theory holds that the mass media cover deviant political groups differently than they do centrist political groups and that the effect of this differing coverage is to decrease the legitimacy of the group, thereby decreasing the group's opportunities to reach its goals and removing threats to the status quo.

Shoemaker (1982) tested one part of this theory experimentally. She manipulated media coverage of political groups by writing fake news stories about fake (but apparently credible) splinter political parties and by having them set in type so as to appear to have been taken from real newspapers. The articles were presented to subjects as randomly selected newspaper articles which appeared just before the 1980 presidential election.

Factor analysis of the data revealed four dimensions of legitimacy: evaluation, legality, viability, and stability. There was a main effect of media treatment on each dimension, and all dimensions but stability showed an interaction between media treatment and whether the political group was represented as being left- or right-wing.

The experiments showed that legitimacy is not a homogeneous variable. Legitimacy actually contains a number of different dimensions, all of which do not react in the same way to experimental manipulation. The mass media can affect all four of these dimensions, although apparently in different ways.

What the experiments did not show, of course, is whether and to what extent these positive and negative treatments occur in the real world of newspapers and television. Since only a content analysis can do that, the next test of the theory included a content analysis of newspaper articles' treatment of some real deviant political groups. It also seemed appropriate to look at

the relationship between journalists' ratings of a group's deviance and the kinds of articles their newspapers publish about the group. If the media treat different political groups in different ways, then the theory predicts that the treatments will vary according to the deviance of the group.

The primary hypothesis tested was that there would be a linear, negative relationship between the deviance of a political group and the degree to which newspaper articles about the group portray it as being legitimate. The more deviant the group, the less legitimate the group will be portrayed as being.

A second hypothesis tested the contention (offered by Stokes, 1963; and by Kornberg, Mishler, and Smith, 1975) that politically sophisticated and knowledgeable people order groups in a left-right fashion. Since the respondents in this study are news and political editors of large daily newspapers, we should be able to assume that they are knowledgeable and politically sophisticated. Therefore, the liberal-conservative political spectrum ought to predict just as well as a multidimensional index.

METHODOLOGY

The dependent variable was media treatment, as shown through a content analysis. The independent variable was the deviance of

the different political groups, as rated by news and political editors. The unit of analysis was the political group--both the overall media treatment of a group during a 12-month period (dependent variable) and the editors' rating of a group on several scales (independent variable).[1]

Eleven political groups were selected for study, on the assumption that they varied in deviance. The groups included: League of Women Voters, Sierra Club, Common Cause, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, National Organization for Women, National Rifle Association, Moral Majority, Jewish Defense League, Communist party, Ku Klux Klan, and the Nazis.

Deviance was measured by asking news and political editors from the 100 largest U.S. daily newspapers (as rated by Editor & Publisher Yearbook 1981) to place the various groups on four scales which were thought to measure political deviance. The survey was sent to the political editor if the newspaper had one, otherwise to the news editor. These large daily newspapers were selected because their editors were more likely to have direct experience with the political groups being studied and were also more likely to have news holes big enough to have actually carried articles about the groups. Political editors and news editors were selected also because of their supposed exposure to and experience with covering political groups.

The first deviance scale used was a political spectrum, similar to Gans', with these values: left-wing radical, very liberal, liberal, moderate, conservative, very conservative, and right-wing radical. For the analysis, the scale was "folded," so that it became a four-point ideological scale ranging from centrist (the moderate position) to very deviant (the left- or right-wing radical positions). This recoding yielded a scale which measured the distance of the group from the center of the political spectrum by removing differences due to the side of the political spectrum on which the group lies. Although the groups being tested are from both sides of the spectrum, the theory does not predict that right-wing groups would be treated any differently than left-wing groups.

Selecting other measures of deviance to form a multidimensional index was not easy. Stokes (1963) says that the dimensions used by individuals may change widely over time. Dimensions used by other researchers seem to be bound to the specific time, place, and political entities studied.

The structural variables present in this study suggest that three measures of deviance might be relevant in addition to the folded ideological scale:

(1) Similarity to most Americans. The survey question used was: "Some groups and individuals hold views which are a lot like the views held by the majority of Americans, while others hold very different views. Circle the category which you think best

describes how close these groups are to the way most Americans think." Possible responses included: very similar to most Americans, somewhat similar to most Americans, somewhat dissimilar to most Americans, and very dissimilar to most Americans.

(2) Amount of change advocated. The survey asked the following: "Some groups and individuals like traditional values and want things to remain much the same as they are now, while others would like to see changes made. Circle the category which best describes your impression of how much change these groups are advocating." Possible responses included: happy with things the way they are now, some changes should take place, quite a few changes are needed, and extreme changes are needed.

(3) How close the editor felt to the group. The question was: "Circle the category which reflects how close you feel to the ideas and actions of each of these groups." Possible responses included: very close, quite close, somewhat close, and not at all close.

These dimensions have the advantage of being broad; using specific issue dimensions didn't seem appropriate considering the wide variety of groups the editors were asked to compare. While it may be possible to meaningfully rate the Sierra Club on an environmental issue, such a rating for the Ku Klux Klan is probably meaningless.

It should be apparent that only perceptions of deviance were measured. Whether these perceptions accurately reflect some real

definition of deviance is open to conjecture. Labeling theorists would probably say that, for an editor (and, supposedly, his newspaper) to call a group deviant is to render that group deviant.

Since the hypotheses under consideration predict a relationship between the deviance of a group and a newspaper's treatment of that group, it seems only reasonable to use the editors' ratings of deviance as the predictor. This is likely to be a better predictor of media treatment than another measure would be.

Two of the newspapers included in the study had ceased publication by February 1982. Of the remaining 98 editors, 57 returned the questionnaire in time to be included in the analysis, a 60 percent return.

Media treatment was measured by a content analysis. Establishing the sampling frame for the content analysis was something of a problem, since local budget cuts were limiting factors in getting access to newspaper indexes and to microfilmed copies of newspapers. Several indexes and several newspapers just were not available.

A 12-month time frame was selected for analysis. For various reasons having mainly to do with access to indexes and microfilms, the analysis was performed for the July 1, 1980, to June 30, 1981, time period for seven newspapers--the Atlanta Constitution,

Chicago Tribune, Christian Science Monitor, Los Angeles Times, New York Times, San Francisco Chronicle, and the Washington Post.

A New York Times Info Bank computer search of the 11 deviant groups in the 7 newspapers yielded a list of 538 news and feature articles dealing with each group in the 12-month period. (Editorials, commentary, letters to the editor, and advertisements were not included.) Since some articles mentioned more than one of the 11 political groups, the sampling frame became a total of 604 articles (counting each time one of the 11 groups was mentioned in an article as one article).

It soon became obvious that the vast majority of the articles in the sampling frame were from the New York Times. Table 1 shows the breakdown of articles per newspaper. This cannot reflect the true number of articles about the 11 political groups published in these seven newspapers. While the New York Times Info Bank states that it indexes all articles on its subject-topics in these newspapers, it seems clear that it is actually indexing all or nearly all of the New York Times and some of the other newspapers. The problem was not one of waiting for updating of the index, since more than six months had passed since the last date searched, and there were articles from all of the newspapers throughout the 12-month period.

The result is that the content analysis is representative of the New York Times, but probably not of the other newspapers. This is a threat to external validity.

A random sample of articles dealing with each group was drawn from the computer list. At least 10 articles were sampled from each group, and at least 20 percent of the articles were included in the sample. The purpose was to ensure both that there were a sufficient number of articles about a group to be reliably analyzed and that the sample was large enough to be representative of the population of articles.

A weighting system which would return the sample proportions to those of the population was considered but rejected, since the unit of analysis is the mean media coverage for a group, and means are not affected by weighting. Table 2 shows the numbers of articles in both the sample and population for each political group.

The content analysis was based on two overall dimensions of media treatment--prominence and character--consistent with Lauderdale and Estep's (1980) analysis of bicentennial protest.

Prominence was measured by three indicators: (1) length of the article, (2) position of the article within the newspaper, and (3) the position of the group within the article. Length was measured in standardized column inches and included headlines, text, and photographs. Article position was coded as being on the front page of section one, the front page of another section, or in another location. Group position was coded as the group being discussed throughout the article, only in the first half of the article, or only in the last half of the article.

Article character was based on the four legitimacy dimensions--evaluation, legality, viability, and stability--and could alternately be called "media portrayal of group legitimacy." The measurement scheme was adapted from Osgood's (1959) description of evaluation assertion analysis. In "legitimacy assertion analysis," the articles were translated into a series of evaluation words and phrases, legality assertions, viability assertions, and stability assertions. A two-letter code was assigned to each group name and substituted in the phrases and assertions so that two of the three coders would have no knowledge of the group's true identity, consistent with Osgood's method. (One of the coders was the person who assigned the two-letter codes.)

The assertions were coded using Osgood's complicated two-step method of coding verbals connectors and common meaning material. Evaluation codes consisted only of common meaning material, since evaluation was taken to be indicated best by the nouns and adjectives that described the group, a group member, or a possession of the group, e.g., "the splinter group," "a very nice fellow," or "the group's plot." Legality, viability, and stability assertions consisted of both verbal connectors and common meaning material. An assertion's score was the product of these two ratings.

Evaluation words and phrases are those which reveal the writer's attitude toward the group. Evaluations include attitudes

toward the group as evidenced in these indicators: (1) The degree to which the writer likes the group. (2) The degree to which the writer agrees with the group's goals. (3) The writer's confidence that the entity will do the right thing. (4) The perceived value of the group to society.

Legality assertions reveal the kinds of activities the writer selects to include in his article about a group and a sense of whether the group is seen as having a right to participate in political activities and outcomes. Activities of political groups may be seen as either supporting the status quo or as opposing the status quo. These indicators are included in legality: (1) Whether the group is shown as obeying or as breaking U.S. laws. (2) Whether the group participates in normative or nonnormative activities. (3) Whether the group is shown as having a right to exist. (4) Whether the group is shown as respecting or disrespecting the U.S. political system. (5) Whether the group is shown as having a right to assume power within the political system.

Viability assertions are those which indicate the extent to which a group is represented as being able to achieve its goals. Indicators of viability include: (1) The extent and availability of the group's financial resources. (2) The extent of its political and communication skills. (3) The extent to which the group is organized and efficient. (4) The extent to which it can get help from political allies outside of its membership.

Stability assertions indicate the extent to which a group is represented as being consistent and enduring. Indicators include: (1) The length of time the group has already existed. (2) The probability of its existence in the future. (3) The consistency of its policies over time. (4) The extent to which its goals are all related as part of an overall program.

Three coders rated every assertion. The three scores were averaged to arrive at a mean assertion score that was more precise than any single coder's rating.

Then the assertions (or words and phrases, in the case of evaluation) for each legitimacy dimension were averaged within each article, yielding an evaluation article score, a legality article score, a viability article score, and a stability article score. To arrive at an overall group media score for evaluation, legality, viability, stability, length, article position, and group position, the article scores for these individual indicators were averaged within each group.

A group's character score (media portrayal of group legitimacy) was computed as the evaluation mean + the legality mean + the viability mean + the stability mean. Prominence was calculated as length + article position + group position. Indicators of character and prominence were standardized before being used in statistical tests. A group's overall media treatment score was computed by adding the character and prominence scores.[2]

RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

Reliability tests were performed for both the independent and the dependent measures.

Independent Variable Reliability

Reliability (standardized item alpha) of the independent variable measures is shown on tables 3 to 7. The deviance index (table 7) is more reliable than the folded ideology scale (table 3), mostly because of the large disagreement among editors in rating the Jewish Defense League (sd = .84) on the ideology scale (table 8). Several editors seemed unfamiliar with the group, some rating it right-wing, some left-wing, and some moderate. When "folded," however, so that the extreme right- and left-wing positions are combined, this confusion contributes less error to the measure. Folding the scale emphasizes an editor's feeling of how far from the ideological center a group lies.

The editors surveyed are a fairly homogeneous group, as is evident from tables 9 to 14. They are on the whole experienced journalists, having worked as journalists for an average of nearly 23 years. While they talk about politics a lot with family, friends, and coworkers and they do express a lot of interest in

politics, they are generally not active in politics and claim that their political attitudes have little or no effect on their work.

Dependent Variable Reliability

Intercoder reliability (for coding existing assertions) of the dependent content analysis measures was .83 overall, even after being corrected for agreement due to chance. This was considered satisfactorily high, considering the complicated coding structure. See Holsti (1969) for a complete discussion of the reliability formulas used, including Scott's pi.

Descriptive Statistics

Tables 15 to 17 show the unstandardized means and standard deviations for the dependent variables and the number of articles[3] which included assertions from each of the four indicators of character (table 15). Since so few articles included stability assertions, the stability results are probably unreliable.

The League of Women Voters, Sierra Club, Common Cause, and the NAACP generally got the highest scores on the character

indicators, except stability. The National Rifle Association had the longest average article length, with the Nazis having the shortest. The League of Women Voters and the NAACP were the most likely to get front page coverage, but the NAACP was one of the least likely groups to be mentioned throughout an entire article.

The overall media treatment scores showed the League of Women Voters, Common Cause, and the National Rifle Association with the highest scores; the Ku Klux Klan and the Nazis got the lowest media treatment scores.

Unstandardized means (and standard deviations) for the independent variable measures are outlined in table 18. In addition to the 11 political groups, table 18 also gives deviance measures for the Democratic and Republican parties, as well as for "most Americans," "people in your community," and "editors."

Not surprisingly, editors rated "most Americans" as the least deviant of all of the entities they rated; "most Americans" may well be a reference point against which other groups are evaluated. "People in your community" were rated as more deviant than "most Americans," perhaps because the communities in the survey are all large and urban.

The League of Women Voters was a nondeviant group, being rated as more centrist than even the Democratic and Republican parties. Editors rated themselves as more centrist than the Republicans or other people in their communities.

Regression Analyses

Since the theory predicted a linear relationship between deviance and media treatment, both linear and curvilinear relationships were tested. Polynomial analysis of the regression of the various dependent measures was performed on both ideology (the "folded" liberal-conservative continuum) and the deviance index (ideology + similarity to most Americans + amount of change a group advocates + how close the respondent feels to the group).

Correlations among the four deviance measures (see table 19) show that multicollinearity may be a problem. As Lewis-Beck (1980) suggests, one way of overcoming multicollinearity is to combine the individual variables into an index. Since one purpose of this study was to test the multidimensional deviance measure against tne unidimensional ideology measure, such an index is appropriate.

To test the hypothesis that the relationship between deviance and media treatment is a straight line, a hierarchical model was tested which included both quadratic and cubic terms.

Tables 20 through 22 show the results of the various regression analyses. Both the ideology measure and the deviance index predict evaluation, legality, and viability scores very well (table 20). In addition, there is evidence of a quadratic relationship between both legality and viability and both ideology and the deviance index. In no instance did the

cubic term have enough tolerance (tolerance < .001) to enter the regression equation, so the cubic term was dropped from tables 20 to 22 and from the analysis.

Thus there is evidence of a statistically significant relationship between deviance and evaluation, legality, and viability. The more deviant a group is perceived to be by editors, the less favorable (evaluation) the newspaper articles about the group were, and the less legal (or normative) and viable the group was portrayed as being.

The curvilinear relationship between legality and deviance and between viability and deviance was unexpected. The theory predicted a linear relationship, but, as figures 2 and 3 show, there is some tendency for groups that are moderately deviant to be rated higher than very centrist or very deviant groups[4]. This is somewhat consistent with Gans' (1979) contention that journalists are suspicious of extremism of any type and could imply that journalists give the most favorable legality and viability treatments to groups which are moderate in all respects, including moderation.

There was no relationship between ideology or deviance and stability (table 20), possibly because the measures are unreliable due to the small number of articles with stability assertions.

Among the three prominence indicators (table 21), article length and article position showed relationships with the deviance index, but not with ideology.

The significant linear relationship of the deviance index to article length is illustrated in figure 4. The National Rifle Association and the Moral Majority are outlyers, having longer articles on the average than even the least deviant groups. Figure 5 shows only a weak relationship between article position and deviance.

Table 22 shows that both ideology and deviance (figure 6) were good predictors of character, and both showed evidence of a quadratic relationship. As in the indicators legality and viability, the least deviant groups got lower character scores than the moderately deviant groups.

Since, among the prominence indicators, only length showed a strong relationship to ideology or deviance, it is not surprising that neither deviance measure predicts the prominence scores very well. Neither ideology nor deviance showed any significant relationship to prominence (table 22).

Both ideology and deviance showed linear relationships to overall media treatment, but the relationship is obviously due mostly to the character dimension and not to prominence (table 22 and figure 7).

The primary hypothesis was confirmed: There was a statistically significant linear relationship between the deviance

of a political group and its overall media treatment. But breaking the variable media treatment down into its components--first as character and prominence and then as their indicators--makes it apparent that all aspects of media treatment are not related to deviance. Evaluation, article length, and article position showed linear relationships to the deviance index, while legality and viability showed quadratic relationships to deviance. Stability and group position seemed unrelated to deviance.

Uni- Versus Multidimensional Measurement

The second hypothesis was that the unidimensional folded ideology measure would predict as well as the multidimensional deviance index. The correlations between ideology and all of the deviance measures are .71 or greater (table 19), indicating that there may be little to be gained by taking four measurements of deviance instead of one. However, the deviance index does seem more powerful than the folded ideology scale, possibly because of its greater reliability. There are more statistically significant F-ratios using the deviance index as a predictor than using the ideology measure. This may indicate that the other three deviance measures--similarity to most Americans, amount of change

advocated, and closeness to the respondent's position--are able to add enough predictive power to justify their inclusion.

DISCUSSION

This study does lend some support to the theory that the media act as agents of social stability. However, the findings should not be taken as evidence of a direct causal relationship between the journalist's perception of how deviant a political group is and the kind of article he will write about the group, or, as Miliband (1969) puts it, "the more radical the dissent, the less impartial and objective the media."

There are several reasons why causality cannot be assumed: First, the editors who were surveyed were not the editors of the newspapers in the content analysis. The literature would have us believe that journalists' opinions about political groups are more alike than different, being based on a "context of shared values." (Sigal, 1973) If there is a context of shared values, then editors on large, daily newspapers ought to have similar views as editors on the newspapers in the content analysis. The reliability coefficients for the deviance measures lend some, but not overwhelming, support for this assumption.

Second, the respondents in the survey were editors and were not necessarily responsible for writing newspaper articles.

However, several researchers (such as Sigal, 1973; Gans, 1979; and Paletz and Entman, 1981) have found that journalists share a creed, norms, a concept of journalistic professionalism. Gans says that an editor often "softens" a reporter's copy to alter hard words and prhases if he disagrees with the harsh words, but he will rarely change the words if he agrees with them. In addition, editors have some control over what is reported when they give reporters assignments and direction wover what should be included in the article.

Epstein (1981) says that news organizations do exert influence over the presentation of the news by screening, editing, and okaying every news story before it is published. The introduction of electronic editing equipment has increased the editor's opportunities to alter stories.

Third, the content analysis preceded the deviance ratings in time, thereby violating one of the criteria necessary for inferring causality. The assumption is that such opinions about political groups are fairly stable and enduring. While opinions about political groups can and do change over time, they probably do not fluctuate greatly in the short run unless events occur which affect opinions about the groups. In this study, the content analysis preceded the deviance measures by several months, and there is no reason to suspect that intervening events significantly changed editors' opinions of the groups. Of course, there is no way to be certain.

Fourth, while several of the observed F-ratios are big enough to be statistically significant, some are probably not big enough to be of practical significance. Draper and Smith (1981) say that, to be a worthwhile predictor, a regression equation must be associated with F-ratios of "at least four or five times the usual percentage point for the minimum level of proper representation."

At four times alpha=.05, the F-ratios must exceed 20.48 (for df=1,9), 21.28 (for df=1,8), or 17.84 (for df=2,8). Several of the F-ratios for legality, viability, character, and media treatment (tables 20 and 22) do meet this criterion, but most do not.

Fifth, there may be several possible alternative explanations for the significant relationship between deviance and media treatment of political groups. The relationship of deviance to legality may be explained if deviant groups do take part in more illegal activities than nondeviant groups.

The relationship of deviance to viability is somewhat more difficult to explain. Are deviance groups less viable? Do they have less money? Fewer allies and members? Are they less competent? These questions are difficult to answer in general, but at least one deviant group, the Moral Majority, seems to possess a vast following, huge financial resources, and a very effective communications program.

If the media are acting as agents of social control, however, we would expect them to portray a political group as nonviable.

Viability--or the perceived lack of it--has long been the bane of third parties in the United States. Many people hesitate to "throw away" their votes on nonviable candidates. If the media can control the electorate's perception of a candidate's viability, then they can probably affect that candidate's chances of winning the election.

Maybe deviant groups do participate in more illegal and nonnormative activities. Maybe deviant groups do have less money, are less competent, and do not achieve their goals as often. Maybe journalists merely reflect the groups as they really are.

Maybe. Barber (1978) points out how just being trained to be a reporter will cause a journalist to emphasize the differences between people and to ignore the similarities. "The reporter's raw material is differences--between what was and what is, expectations and events, reputations and realities, normal and exotic--and his artful eye is set to see the moment when the flow of history knocks two differences together." People and groups begin to develop distinctive personalities based on their idiosyncrasies. The more eccentric, the more newsworthy.

The common threads among people and groups are overlooked. This is as true of the centrist candidates as it is of the others, of course, but the consequences are far more serious for the presidential candidate of a left- or a right-wing splinter political party than for the Republicans or Democrats. Centrist party candidates tend to be more similar than dissimilar; even in

their differences they are often barely distinguishable. But the gulf that separates far left- and far right-wing political parties from the Democrats and Republicans is mighty indeed. And the greater those perceived differences, the greater the chance that the deviant political party will be represented as not being a legitimate contender for political power.

Every time a journalist writes an article, he makes decisions. What facts shall be included? How shall they be presented? In what order?

All political groups hold meetings. Are they covered by the media? Sometimes. Some political groups participate in violent activities. Are they covered? Always. Are the normative activities of centrist groups more likely to be covered than the normative activities of deviant groups? Perhaps.

Sometimes activities that would be considered normative if undertaken by a centrist group are presented in the media as if they are nonnormative. One article in the sample (Atlanta Constitution, December 12, 1980) reported that the Ku Klux Klan had entered a float in a Christmas parade in Griffin, Georgia. The page one, column one headline reads: "Klan's float startles Griffin parade crowd."

Did the Klansmen ride naked on the float? Did their float include a burning cross? Apparently not, since the newspaper described the float as a "flat-bed truck bearing five robed, but unmasked, Klansmen." The float also played a taped recording of

"Dixie," and children riding on the back of the float tossed pieces of candy to the crowd.

What could be more normative than entering a float in a hometown Christmas parade? What could be more normative than playing "Dixie" in Georgia? Yet the very presence of the float was seen as nonnormative. The article began: "It shouldn't have been, but there it was. Right in the middle of this town's annual Christmas parade was a float entered by the local Klu [sic] Klux Klan chapter."

A KKK member was quoted as saying that the float was only the beginning of efforts by the KKK to participate in community events. In a centrist group, this would be seen as definitely normative and probably as indicating a publically aware, definitely viable group. Yet the KKK's sponsorship of a parade float was presented as nonnormative, ridiculous, and nonviable.

> The float so shocked many parade watchers that they threw back pieces of candy tossed into the crowd by children riding on the back of the U.S. and Confederate flag-bedecked truck. And officials of the Chamber of Commerce, which sponsors the parade, immediately took action to keep radical organizations out of future parades.

The KKK did enter the parade under another name, which accounted for the Chamber's surprise. But this deception was almost incidental in the article to the float itself.

At times media coverage of deviant political groups combines the ridiculous with the sublime, almost as if the journalist were

purposely trying to balance favorable and unfavorable facts. An article about Jerry Falwell and the Moral Majority in the Washington Post (June 28, 1981) was titled "A silver anniversary and a search for gold." The article, which began in a box on page one, read:

> The empire was founded a quarter-century ago today, when 35 people gathered in the former warehouse of a soft-drink bottling company, the floor sticky with the residue of Donald Duck Cola, to listen to a 22-year-old Baptist preacher named Jerry Falwell. That day the Thomas Road Baptist Church collected $125.
>
> This week the church, now the nation's second largest, will collect more than $1 million, but not by passing the collection plate among its 18,000-member congregation. The pastor will raise the money through the electronic church, from people who watch the Sunday service on their television sets and mail in their offerings.

The Donald Duck Bottling Company appears again in the story, as well as mention of the empire's vast riches. Other balances include a report of how the Securities and Exchange Commission charged Falwell with fraud and deceit in 1973, a description of Falwell's private jet, the mysterious death of a Falwell enemy, the vast numbers of Falwell's supporters, and rumors of financial trouble in the empire.

The facts are all there. There are ample comparisons of rumors both favorable to and unfavorable to Falwell. Yet on balance Falwell and the Moral Majority come off as nonnormative and not viable.

The tendency for coverage about deviant groups to have lower evaluation scores may be even more striking. There are probably fewer alternative explanations for a low evaluation score than for a low legality or viability score. Evaluation, remember, was rated as how favorable or unfavorable the words were which described a group, a group's member, or a possession of the group.

Deviant groups (such as the Ku Klux Klan, the Nazis, and the Communists) got labels like these: an avowed racist, vehement, self-righteous, a violent group, a splinter group, a hate group, killers, a racist nominee, extremists, a cabal of conspirators, crazy, and a bunch of lunatics.

Centrist groups (such as the League of Women Voters, the Sierra Club, and Common Cause) were called: the club, environmentalists, conservationist, a nonpartisan group, the public affairs lobbying group, the Washington-based public interest lobby, savvy, hardworking, intelligent, and fair.

KKK members are overweight and frightening, while League of Women Voters members are trim and gracious. When Nazis assemble, they're a platoon; when members of the Sierra Club get together, they're a group.

These examples are out of context and overstated, of course, to make the point. Nearly all of the groups got both high and low scores on some evaluation, legality, viability, and stability

assertions. Often the good comments were balanced with the bad, but the overall impression of the deviant groups is unfavorable.

Some of these differences are real ones, to be sure. The point is not that media coverage of deviant groups does not reflect some real differences between centrist and deviant groups, but that it may emphasize and accentuate the differences and ignore the similarities.

This study does not prove that journalists intentionally select different elements for inclusion in articles about deviant groups than they do for centrist groups. But it does show that the critics weren't all wrong. Deviant groups will probably continue to be perceived as being less legitimate. Whether that perception is due more to the media than to the groups themselves remains to be seen.

NOTES

[1]Using the group as the unit of analysis limited the degrees of freedom available in statistical tests to 11. Statistical tests were also performed using "article" as the unit of analysis, and the results were practically identical, even though 152 degrees of freedom were available. While the dependent variable could be easily measured on the article level, the independent variable could not be. Deviance ratings were collected at the group level and could only be used at the article level by a "composite" procedure, e.g., assigning every article about the Nazis the same deviance scores. Thus, while individual article scores about the Nazis, for example, did vary on the dependent variable, there was no variance among the independent scores for the different Nazi articles. Since the theory predicts variance in media treatment between groups, not variance between articles, the idea of using article as the unit of analysis was abandoned.

[2]Indicators of the dependent variables were also multiplied, but these failed to produce statistically significant results. In lieu of a theoretical reason to suppose that the relationship among indicators is additive or multiplicative, the statistically significant additive procedure was reported. This does not necessarily mean that the additive procedure is "correct," however. McLeod and Becker (1974) also found additive procedures to show more significant results than multiplicative procedures, but they were looking at various regression equations with combinations of independent variables.

[3]Because the sampled articles about any one group varied drastically in length and in content, some articles did not have assertions for all four of the character indicators. This was especially true of the indicator "stability"; very few articles included any stability assertions. Wherever there were no assertions for an indicator, the value was indicated as missing data. As a result, the mean indicator scores are based on different Ns, and the statistical tests are based only on the assertions present in the articles. To aid in interpreting the results, the N that each statistic is based on is included in each table.

[4]Because the scatterplots are very similar whether the folded ideology scale or the deviance index is used, only the plots for the deviance index are shown.

Figure 1. Simple causal chain model of theory.


Journalists' perceptions of the group's deviance
Media treatment of the group
Readers' perception of the group's legitimacy
Group's success in achieving its goals
Effect on stability of status quo

Table 1. Number of articles found in each of the seven newspapers.

Newspaper	Total # articles	# articles in sample
New York Times	398	93
Washington Post	57	13
Los Angeles Times	35	14
Atlanta Constitution	21	8
Christian Science Monitor	13	3
Chicago Tribune	10	2
San Francisco Chronicle	4	0
	Total = 538	133

Table 2. Sampling plan for the 11 political groups.

Group	N	n	n/N
Jewish Defense League	11	10	.91
National Rifle Association	15	10	.67
Sierra Club	22	10	.45
National Organization for Women	29	10	.34
Common Cause	33	10	.31
League of Women Voters	47	10	.21
American Nazi Party	48	10	.21
American Communist Party	50	10	.20
Moral Majority	86	18	.21
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People	107	22	.21
Ku Klux Klan	156	32	.21
Total =	604	152	

Table 3. Percentages of editor responses in each category of the folded IDEOLOGY scale and standardized item alpha reliability coefficient.

Group	DISTANCE FROM CENTER OF IDEOLOGICAL SPECTRUM Percentage of editors replying: Center (moderate)	Liberal/ conservative	Very liberal/conservative	Radical left or right	
League of Women Voters	61%	35%	4%		100%
Sierra Club	18	68	14		100%
Common Cause	21	61	14	4	100%
NAACP	11	54	35		100%
NOW	4	47	47	2	100%
NRA		18	63	19	100%
Moral Majority		9	67	24	100%
Jewish Defense League	2	23	28	47	100%
Communists		3	16	81	100%
Ku Klux Klan			4	96	100%
Nazis			2	98	100%

Reliability (standardized item alpha) = .59

Table 4. Percentages of editor responses in each category of the SIMILARITY scale and standardized item alpha reliability coefficient.

Group	SIMILARITY OF GROUP TO MOST AMERICANS Percentage of editors replying: Very similar	Somewhat similar	Somewhat dissimilar	Very dissimilar	
League of Women Voters	25%	70%	5%		100%
Sierra Club	3	51	44	2	100%
Common Cause	5	68	25	2	100%
NAACP	2	47	46	5	100%
NOW		42	46	12	100%
NRA	2	29	57	12	100%
Moral Majority		25	63	12	100%
Jewish Defense League		6	36	58	100%
Communists			4	96	100%
Ku Klux Klan			9	91	100%
Nazis				100	100%

Reliability (standardized item alpha) = .76

Table 5. Percentages of editor responses in each category of the CHANGE scale and standardized item alpha reliability coefficient.

Group	AMOUNT OF CHANGE ADVOCATED Percentage of editors replying: No change	Some changes	Quite a few changes	Extreme changes	
League of Women Voters	14%	77%	9%		100%
Sierra Club		49	51		100%
Common Cause		42	56	2	100%
NAACP		21	75	4	100%
NOW		11	75	14	100%
NRA	30	32	27	11	100%
Moral Majority	2	9	63	26	100%
Jewish Defense League		18	40	42	100%
Communists			2	98	100%
Ku Klux Klan		2	3	95	100%
Nazis		2	2	96	100%

Reliability (standardized item alpha) = .74

Table 6. Percentages of editor responses in each category of the CLOSE scale and standardized item alpha reliability coefficient.

	HOW CLOSE RESPONDENT FEELS TO THE GROUP Percentage of editors replying:				
Group	Very close	Quite close	Somewhat close	Not at all close	
League of Women Voters	9%	39%	48%	4	100%
Sierra Club	13	32	50	5	100%
Common Cause	11	28	50	11	100%
NAACP	2	30	59	9	100%
NOW	11	25	39	25	100%
NRA		4	14	82	100%
Moral Majority		2	14	84	100%
Jewish Defense League		2	25	73	100%
Communists			5	95	100%
Ku Klux Klan				100	100%
Nazis				100	100%

Reliability (standardized item alpha) = .63

Table 7. Percentages of editor responses in each category of the DEVIANCE INDEX and standardized item alpha reliability coefficient.

	EDITOR RATING OF GROUP DEVIANCE Percentage of editors in each category:				
Group	Not at all deviant	A little deviant	Quite deviant	Extremely deviant	
League of Women Voters	27%	55%	17%	1	100%
Sierra Club	9	50	40	1	100%
Common Cause	9	50	36	5	100%
NAACP	4	38	54	4	100%
NOW	4	31	52	13	100%
NRA	8	21	40	31	100%
Moral Majority	1	11	52	36	100%
Jewish Defense League	1	12	32	55	100%
Communists		1	7	92	100%
Ku Klux Klan		1	4	95	100%
Nazis		1	1	98	100%

Reliability (standardized item alpha) = .70

Table 8. How editors rated the Jewish Defense League on both the folded and unfolded ideological scales.

Unfolded ideology scale	Number of editors	
Left-wing radical	1	
Very liberal	6	
Liberal	8	
Moderate	1	Mean = 5.34
Conservative	4	SD = 1.97
Very conservative	9	
Right-wing radical	24	
	53	MISSING = 4

Folded ideology scale	Number of editors	
Moderate	1	
Liberal/Conservative	12	Mean = 3.21
Very liberal/conservative	15	SD = .86
Left/right-wing radical	25	
	53	MISSING = 4

Table 9. Number of years the responding editors have been journalists.

Years	N	%
10 or fewer	6	10.5
11 to 20	22	38.6
21 to 30	17	29.8
31 to 40	10	17.5
41 or more	2	3.5
	57	100.0

Mean = 22.6 years
SD = 9.85

Table 10. Frequency with which the editors discuss politics with family and friends.

Frequency	N	%
Never	0	0.0
Rarely	4	7.0
Sometimes	14	24.6
Often	20	35.1
Very often	19	33.3
	57	100.0

Mean = 3.9
SD = .93

Table 11. Frequency with which the editors discuss politics with their coworkers.

Frequency	N	%
Never	0	0.0
Rarely	3	5.3
Sometimes	13	22.8
Often	15	26.3
Very often	26	45.6
	57	100.0

Mean = 4.1
SD = .95

Table 12. The extent to which editors are interested in politics.

Interest	N	%
Not at all interested	2	3.5
A little interested	0	0.0
Somewhat interested	7	12.3
Interested	20	35.1
Very interested	28	49.1
	57	100.0

Mean = 4.3
SD = .94

Table 13. The editors' level of political activity.

Political activity	N	%
Not at all active	42	73.7
Somewhat active	8	14.0
A little active	2	3.5
Active	0	0.0
Very active	5	8.8
	57	100.0

Mean = 1.6
SD = 1.18

Table 14. How much the editors think their political attitudes affect their work.

Effect on work	N	%
None at all	29	51.8
A little	14	25.0
Somewhat	8	14.3
A lot	3	5.4
A whole lot	2	3.6
	57	100.0

MISSING = 1

Mean = 1.8
SD = 1.09

Table 15. Unstandardized means (and standard deviations) for indicators of CHARACTER.

Group	Evaluation[1]	Legality	Viability	Stability
League of Women Voters (10 articles)[2]	10.86 (.69) N=10[3]	13.17 (1.28) N=10	12.49 (2.11) N=10	12.12 (1.91) N= 4
Sierra Club (10 articles)	10.63 (.57) N= 9	12.75 (1.26) N= 9	11.55 (3.22) N= 9	14.50 (.00) N= 1
Common Cause (10 articles)	11.28 (.51) N=10	13.80 (.72) N= 9	12.17 (2.89) N= 9	13.40 (1.39) N= 4
NAACP (22 articles)	11.93 (4.86) N=21	12.56 (1.14) N=21	12.16 (1.88) N=20	13.30 (2.91) N= 4
NOW (10 articles)	10.88 (.38) N= 9	12.89 (1.41) N= 9	13.20 (1.83) N= 9	12.77 (3.73) N= 7
NRA (10 articles)	10.61 (.19) N= 9	12.24 (1.22) N=10	13.42 (.99) N=10	12.38 (3.24) N= 4
Moral Majority (18 articles)	10.04 (.81) N=18	10.98 (1.84) N=18	11.30 (2.80) N=17	12.94 (2.45) N= 8
Jewish Defense League (10 articles)	9.94 (.64) N=10	9.04 (2.70) N=10	10.63 (2.70) N=10	10.75 (6.01) N= 2
Communists (10 articles)	10.01 (.76) N= 9	9.76 (3.35) N= 9	8.64 (2.96) N= 8	14.20 (4.02) N= 3
KKK (32 articles)	9.52 (1.05) N=32	7.21 (2.36) N=31	8.01 (2.15) N=27	10.20 (4.49) N=12
Nazis (10 articles)	8.99 (.87) N=10	6.60 (1.94) N=10	6.63 (1.91) N=10	10.00 (.00) N= 1

[1]Scales range from 1.00 to 19.00. A score of 10.00 is neutral. The higher the score, the more legal (or normative), viable, stable, or favorably evaluated.

[2]The number of articles about that group in the sample.

[3]Ns indicate the number of articles (in the sample about a particular group) that included one or more assertions from that particular dimension, e.g., only four of the sample articles about the League of Women Voters included stability assertions.

Table 16. Unstandardized means (and standard deviations) for indicators of PROMINENCE.

Group	Article[1] Length	Article[2] Position	Group[3] Position
League of Women Voters (N=10)[4]	26.62 (22.44)	1.80 (.92)	2.70 (.67)
Sierra Club (N=10)	22.91 (15.71)	1.10 (.32)	2.30 (.95)
Common Cause (N=10)	23.69 (33.72)	1.10 (.32)	2.90 (.32)
NAACP (N=22)	17.70 (17.59)	1.59 (.91)	2.59 (.73)
NOW (N=10)	13.20 (7.20)	1.20 (.42)	2.80 (.42)
NRA (N=10)	38.30 (47.93)	1.40 (.84)	2.70 (.67)
Moral Majority (N=18)	28.82 (24.57)	1.33 (.69)	2.72 (.57)
Jewish Defense League (N=10)	8.39 (14.52)	1.10 (.32)	2.60 (.70)
Communists (N=10)	9.86 (10.89)	1.20 (.63)	2.60 (.70)
KKK (N=32)	9.52 (8.48)	1.22 (.61)	2.81 (.47)
Nazis (N=10)	6.22 (4.08)	1.00 (.00)	2.90 (.32)

[1]Average length of all articles about the group in standardized column inches.

[2]Ranges from 1.00 to 3.00. A high article position score indicates that tne group was on the average featured on the first page of the newspaper or on the first page of another section.

[3]Ranges from 1.00 to 3.00. A high group position score indicates that the group was on the average mentioned throughout the article, as opposed to only the first half (a moderate score) or only in the last half (a low score).

[4]Number of sample articles about that group. No missing data.

Table 17. CHARACTER, PROMINENCE, and MEDIA TREATMENT scores for the political groups.

Group	Character[1]	Prominence[2]	Media Treatment[3]
League of Women Voters	1.90	3.00	4.89
Sierra Club	2.60	-2.61	- .02
Common Cause	3.35	.96	4.31
NAACP	3.57	.62	4.19
NOW	2.56	- .23	2.33
NRA	1.81	2.47	4.28
Moral Majority	.04	1.40	1.43
Jewish Defense League	-2.59	-2.28	-4.87
Communists	- .85	-1.72	-2.58
KKK	-5.37	- .44	-5.80
Nazis	-7.00	-1.16	-8.17

[1]Character is the sum of the four (standardized) character indicators--evaluation + legality + viability + stability.

[2]Prominence is the sum of the three (standardized) prominence indicators--article length + article position + group position.

[3]Media treatment = character + prominence.

Table 18. Unstandardized means (and standard deviations) for independent variables, N=57.

Group	Ideology	Similar	Change	Close	Deviance Index
Most Americans[1]	1.36 (.48)	2.44 (.60)	1.97 (.33)	2.66 (.48)	2.11 (.58)
LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS	1.40 (.57)	1.77 (.56)	1.94 (.52)	2.48 (.74)	1.90 (.43)
Democrats	1.56 (.54)	1.81 (.53)	2.17 (.47)	2.65 (.64)	2.05 (.32)
Editors	1.64 (.59)	2.19 (.59)	2.30 (.50)	2.00 (.71)	2.03 (.29)
People in your community	1.73 (.52)	1.77 (.57)	2.02 (.35)	2.64 (.59)	2.04 (.42)
Republicans	1.94 (.48)	1.90 (.47)	1.94 (.52)	3.08 (.71)	2.21 (.32)
SIERRA CLUB	1.96 (.54)	2.44 (.58)	2.54 (.50)	2.46 (.82)	2.35 (.39)
COMMON CAUSE	2.00 (.65)	2.23 (.56)	2.60 (.49)	2.56 (.85)	2.35 (.41)
NAACP	2.21 (.65)	2.54 (.62)	2.83 (.48)	2.77 (.66)	2.59 (.38)
NOW	2.50 (.58)	2.67 (.66)	3.08 (.50)	2.75 (.91)	2.75 (.51)
NRA	3.00 (.62)	2.79 (.65)	2.21 (.99)	3.81 (.49)	2.95 (.52)
MORAL MAJORITY	3.15 (.50)	2.81 (.57)	3.15 (.62)	3.79 (.46)	3.22 (.40)
JEWISH DEFENSE LEAGUE	3.25 (.84)	3.56 (.58)	3.33 (.69)	3.71 (.50)	3.46 (.50)
COMMUNISTS	3.75 (.53)	3.96 (.20)	3.98 (.14)	3.94 (.24)	3.91 (.21)
KKK	3.96 (.20)	3.92 (.28)	3.92 (.35)	4.00 (.00)	3.95 (.13)
NAZIS	3.98 (.14)	4.00 (.00)	3.94 (.32)	4.00 (.00)	3.98 (.09)

NOTE: Scales range from 1.00 to 4.00. A high score denotes more deviance, i.e., further from the center of the ideological scale, not similar to most Americans, advocates extreme changes, not at all close to the respondent's personal beliefs. The deviance index was computed by adding the mean responses to the four scales and dividing by 4.

[1]Groups in capital letters are the political groups used in this study. Lower case entries are intended as reference points for the 11 groups in the study and may provide data for a future study.

Table 19. Correlation coefficients among independent variable scales and the deviance index. N=57.

CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS	Ideology	Similar	Change	Close	Deviance Index
Ideology	--	.97	.87	.95	.99
Similar		--	.92	.87	.98
Change			--	.71	.92
Close				--	.92
Deviance Index					--

Table 20. Polynomial analysis of EVALUATION, LEGALITY, VIABILITY, and STABILITY on ideology (top) and deviance (bottom). N=11.

Dependent variables	IDEOLOGY standardized B_1	IDEOLOGY^2 standardized B_2	R^2	IR^2
EVALUATION				
linear	- .81[c]		.65 [c]	
quadratic	1.70	-2.52	.76 [c]	.10
LEGALITY				
linear	- .89[c]*		.80[c]*	
quadratic	1.46	-2.37[b]	.89[c]*	.09[b]
VIABILITY				
linear	- .78[c]		.61[c]	
quadratic	3.14[b]	-3.95[c]	.86[c]*	.25[c]
STABILITY				
linear	- .52		.27	
quadratic	1.93	-2.46	.37	.10

Dependent variables	DEVIANCE standardized B_1	DEVIANCE^2 standardized B_2	R^2	IR^2
EVALUATION				
linear	- .81[c]		.65[c]	
quadratic	1.96	-2.78	.72[c]	.07
LEGALITY				
linear	- .91[c]*		.83[c]*	
quadratic	1.57	-2.49[a]	.89[c]*	.06[a]
VIABILITY				
linear	- .82[c]		.68[c]	
quadratic	4.04[b]	-4.88[c]	.89[c]*	.22[c]
STABILITY				
linear	- .50		.25	
quadratic	1.80	-2.31	.30	.05

[a] $p < .10$ [b] $p < .05$ [c] $p < .01$

*Exceeds Draper and Smith's (1981) criterion of having an F-ratio "at least four or five times the usual percentage point." The "usual" percentage point used was alpha = .05.

Table 21. Polynomial analysis of LENGTH, ARTICLE POSITION, and GROUP POSITION ON ideology (top) and deviance (bottom). N=11.

Dependent variables	IDEOLOGY standardized B_1	IDEOLOGY^2 standardized B_2	R^2	IR^2
LENGTH				
linear	- .52		.27	
quadratic	1.50	-2.04	.33	.07
ARTICLE POSITION				
linear	- .51		.26	
quadratic	-2.07	1.57	.30	.04
GROUP POSITION				
linear	.29		.09	
quadratic	-1.13	1.44	.12	.03

Dependent variables	DEVIANCE standardized B_1	DEVIANCE^2 standardized B_2	R^2	IR^2
LENGTH				
linear	- .61[b]		.37[b]	
quadratic	2.13	-2.75	.44	.07
ARTICLE POSITION				
linear	- .53[a]		.28[a]	
quadratic	-2.69	2.17	.32	.04
GROUP POSITION				
linear	.27		.07	
quadratic	-1.12	1.39	.09	.02

[a] $p < .10$ [b] $p < .05$ [c] $p < .01$

*Exceeds Draper and Smith's (1981) criterion of having an F-ratio "at least four or five times the usual percentage point." The "usual" percentage point used was alpha = .05.

Table 22. Polynomial analysis of CHARACTER, PROMINENCE, and MEDIA TREATMENT on ideology (top) and deviance (bottom). N=11.

Dependent variables	IDEOLOGY standardized B_1	IDEOLOGY^2 standardized B_2	R^2	IR^2
CHARACTER				
linear	- .84[c]*		.71[c]*	
quadratic	2.32[b]	-3.19[b]	.87[c]*	.16[b]
PROMINENCE				
linear	- .39		.15	
quadratic	- .91	.52	.16	.01
MEDIA TREATMENT				
linear	- .80[c]		.64[c]	
quadratic	1.40	-2.22	.72[c]	.08

Dependent variables	DEVIANCE standardized B_1	DEVIANCE^2 standardized B_2	R^2	IR^2
CHARACTER				
linear	- .85[c]*		.72[c]*	
quadratic	2.60	-3.47[b]	.83[c]*	.11[b]
PROMINENCE				
linear	- .46		.22	
quadratic	- .90	.44	.22	.00
MEDIA TREATMENT				
linear	- .84[c]*		.71[c]*	
quadratic	1.65	-2.50	.76[c]	.05

[a] $p < .10$ [b] $p < .05$ [c] $p < .01$

*Exceeds Draper and Smith's (1981) criterion of having an F-ratio "at least four or five times the usual percentage point." The "usual" percentage point used was alpha = .05.

Figure 2. Plot of group LEGALITY scores by group deviance.



Linear equation: $Y = -.91X - .91$

F_B: 43.867^c df=1,9

Quadratic equation: $Y = 1.57X - 2.49X^2 - .91$

F_{B_i}: (1.561) 3.936 df=1,8

[a] $p < .1$
[b] $p < .05$
[c] $p < .01$

CC = Common Cause
CP = Communist Party
JDL = Jewish Defense League
KKK = Ku Klux Klan
LWV = League of Women Voters
MM = Moral Majority
NAACP = Nat'l Assn. for the Advancement of Colored People
NAZI = Nazis
NOW = Nat'l Org. for Women
NRA = Nat'l Rifle Assn.
SC = Sierra Club

Figure 3. Plot of group VIABILITY scores by group deviance.



Linear equation: $Y = -.82X - .25$

F_B: 19.052^c df=1,9

Quadratic equation: $Y = 4.04X - 4.88X^2 + .14$

F_B : (11.231^b) 16.434^c df=1,8
i

[a] $p < .1$
[b] $p < .05$
[c] $p < .01$

CC = Common Cause
CP = Communist Party
JDL = Jewish Defense League
KKK = Ku Klux Klan
LWV = League of Women Voters
MM = Moral Majority
NAACP = Nat'l Assn. for the Advancement of Colored People
NAZI = Nazis
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NRA = Nat'l Rifle Assn.
SC = Sierra Club

Figure 4. Plot of group ARTICLE LENGTH scores by group deviance.



Linear equation: $Y = -.61X + .91$

F_B: 5.237^b df=1,9

Quadratic equation: $Y = 2.13X - 2.75X^2 + .91$

F_{B_i}: (.581) .968 df=1,8

[a] p < .1
[b] p < .05
[c] p < .01

CC = Common Cause
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KKK = Ku Klux Klan
LWV = League of Women Voters
MM = Moral Majority
NAACP = Nat'l Assn. for the Advancement of Colored People
NAZI = Natis
NOW = Nat'l Org. for Women
NRA = Nat'l Rifle Assn.
SC = Sierra Club

Figure 5. Plot of group ARTICLE POSITION scores by group deviance.



Linear equation: $Y = -.53X - .15$

F_B: 3.504^a df=1,9

Quadratic equation: $Y = -2.69X + 2.17X^2 - .22$

F_B : (.774) .504 df=1,8
i

[a] $p < .1$
[b] $p < .05$
[c] $p < .01$

CC = Common Cause
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LWV = League of Women Voters
MM = Moral Majority
NAACP = Nat'l Assn. for the Advancement of Colored People
NAZI = Nazis
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NRA = Nat'l Rifle Assn.
SC = Sierra Club

Figure 6. Plot of group CHARACTER scores by group deviance.



Linear equation: $Y = -.85X + .22$

F_B: 22.842^c df=1,9

Quadratic equation: $Y = 2.61X - 3.47X^2 + .64$

F_B : (2.820) 4.999^b df=1,8

i

[a] $p < .1$
[b] $p < .05$
[c] $p < .01$

CC = Common Cause
CP = Communist Party
JDL = Jewish Defense League
KKK = Ku Klux Klan
LWV = League of Women Voters
MM = Moral Majority
NAACP = Nat'l Assn. for the Advancement of Colored People
NAZI = Nazis
NOW = Nat'l Org. for Women
NRA = Nat'l Rifle Assn.
SC = Sierra Club

Figure 7. Plot of group MEDIA TREATMENT scores by group deviance.



Linear equation: $Y = -.84X - .33$
F_B: 21.787^c df=1,9

Quadratic equation: $Y = 1.65X - 2.50X^2 + .57$
F_{B_i}: (.836) 1.924 df=1,8

[a] $p < .1$
[b] $p < .05$
[c] $p < .01$

CC = Common Cause
CP = Communist Party
JDL = Jewish Defense League
KKK = Ku Klux Klan
LWV = League of Women Voters
MM = Moral Majority
NAACP = Nat'l Assn. for the Advancement of Colored People
NAZI = Nazis
NOW = Nat'l Org. for Women
NRA = Nat'l Rifle Assn.
SC = Sierra Club

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